Teoria dhe Praktika e Administrimit Ndërkombëtar

By Leonard Ibrahimi

Dhjetë vite të administrimeve ndërkombëtare: nga Bosnja dhe Hercegovina në Irak


Tezat:

1. Administrimet ndërkombëtare të dekadës së fundit, me përjashtime të rralla, karakterizohen nga një qeverisje jo e mirë.

2. Mungesa e mandatit të qartë të administrimeve ndërkombëtare ka determinuar mungesën e strategjive dalëse (exit strategy ) të këtyre administrimeve

Hulumtimet në lidhje e tezën e parë:

Ndonëse qëllimi i misioneve të ndryshme të administrimit ndërkombëtar ishte ndërtimi i shoqërive demokratike, shumica e tyre nuk i kishin zbatuar gjithmonë parimet e qeverisjes së mirë.[1] Qeverisja e mirë inkoorporon në vete: legjitimitetin, llogaridhënien, transparencën, konsultimin dhe përfshirjen e opinionit publik vendor në vendim-marrje.[2] Shumicën e këtyre elementeve nuk i takojmë në misionet e administrimeve ndërkombëtare të dhjetëvjeçarit të fundit.[3] Konkretisht, në Kosovë pas themelimit të institucioneve vendore, kemi një situatë përplasjeje (kolizioni) në mes të dy legjitimiteteve që qeverisin Kosovën: legjitimitetin etatik (etatique legitimacy), të përfaqësuar nga PSSP-ja dhe legjitimitetin demokratik të përfaqësuar nga Institucionet e Përkohshme të Vetëqeverisjes.[4]

Mungesa e legjitimitetit e karakterizonte edhe Administratën Transnacionale të Kombeve të Bashkuara në Timorin Lindor (UNTAET);[5] ky mision u mundua ta kompensoj mungesën e legjitimitetit duke aplikuar sistemin e bashkëqeverisjes me vendorët (“Timorization“ of the mission).[6] Sidoqoftë, vështirë mund të thuhet se UNTAET-i kishte legjitimitet demokratik, as Vieira de Mello si administrator e as personeli i tij nuk ishin në mënyrë të drejtpërdrejt përgjegjës para qytetarëve të Timorit Lindor.[7] Misionet e Kombeve të Bashkuara mund të kenë legjitimitetin legal, që rrjedh nga rezolutat e Këshillit të Sigurimit të Kombeve të Bashkuara, të cilat i mbështesin ato, por jo edhe legjitimitetin politik.[8] Kuptohet se, legjitimiteti legal dallon plotësisht prej legjitimitetit politik, i cili në rethana normale sigurohet nga zgjedhjet e lira dhe është shumë i rëndësishëm për ndërtimin e shoqërive demokratike.[9]

Konsultimi, përkatësisht përfshirja e opinionit publik vendor në vendim-marrje është dukuri shumë e rrallë në misionet e administrimit ndërkombëtar.[10] Qytetarët vendas jo vetëm që nuk konsultoheshin gjatë vendim-marrjes,[11] por në të shumtën e rasteve administrimet ndërkombëtare u ngjanin administratave autoritare, jo-transparente dhe të papërgjegjshme që me popullatën vendore krijonin raporte subordinimi e jo partneriteti.[12] Duke filluar me UNTAES-in në Sllavoninë Lindore, për të vazhduar me UNMIK-un në Kosovë dhe UNTAET-in në Timorin Lindor, OKB-ja aplikoi në praktikë teorinë e “territorit të ndërkombëtarizuar”.[13] Madje në Kosovë, OKB-ja ka instaluar një model unik të administrimit, ku kemi sundim absolut të PSSP-së me legjitimitet etatik (etatique legitimacy) dhe me kompetenca të pakufizuara.[14] Në Afganistan, kompetencat e ndërkombëtarëve ishin më të vogla,[15] kurse në Irakun e pasluftës, për dallim nga format tjera të administrimit hasim administrimin ushtarak me autoritetin ekskluziv vendim-marrës, koalicionin ushtarak – deri në nxjerrjen e kushtetutës së re të Irakut dhe legjitimimin e qeverisë së re përmes zgjedhjeve.[16]


Hulumtimet në lidhje e tezën e dytë:

Misionet e administrimit ndërkombëtar të instaluara në vendet post-konfliktuoze nga ana e OKB-së, në të shumtën e rasteve nuk kishin një mandat të qartë.[17] Mungesa e mandatit të qartë ka bërë që këto misione edhe pas një kohe të gjatë të krijimit të mos kenë një strategji dalëse (exit strategy).[18] Bie fjala, mungesa e mandatit të qartë që e karakterizon UNMIK-un, ka ndikuar që ky mision i OKB-së i instaluar në Kosovë, edhe pas shumë vite veprimi të mos ketë një strategji dalëse.[19] Alexandros Yannis duke diskutuar për misionet e administrimit ndërkombëtar, me theks të veçantë për UNMIK-un, thotë se prioritet i këtij misioni do të duhej të ishte përcaktimi i cakut, apo siç shprehet ai: ”si të qeveriset në Kosovë” duhet të zëvendësohet me “cili është caku i fundit i Kosovës”.[20]

Mungesa e strategjisë dalëse, si pasojë e mungesës së mandatit të qartë, është evidente edhe në Bosnje dhe Hercegovinë.[21] Për strategjinë dalëse të Irakut as që mund të flitet,[22] zyrtarët e koalicionit bilateral deklarojnë se, të kërkosh strategji dalëse nga Iraku është njejtë si të thuash: “ lëre Lindjen e Mesme të vazhdoj të jetë parajsë për terroristët”.[23]

Ndoshta Administrata Transnacionale e Kombeve të Bashkuara në Timorin Lindor (UNTAET), është ndër të rrallat që kishte mandat të qartë politik.[24] Ky mandat konsistonte në përgatitjen e popullit të Timorit Lindor për pavarësi.[25] Pasi që kishte mandatin e qartë politik, UNTAET-i përpunoi strategjinë dalëse (exit strategy) dhe taktikat për përfundimin e misionit të vet.[26] Timori Lindor mund të shërbej si model i aplikimit të politikave të caktuara në misionet e ndryshme të administrimit ndërkombëtar,[27] qëllimi kryesor i tyre duhet të jetë garantimi i transicionit të sukseshëm në demokraci dhe/ose pavarësi.[28]




Notes:

[1] Blerim Reka, Teoria dhe Praktika e Administrimit Ndërkombëtar, (skripta e autorizuar), fq. 49
[2] John O’Sullivan, “How to Gain Legitimacy in Iraq”, National Review, 3 maj 2004, fq. 3
[3] Ibid. fq. 4
[4] Blerim Reka, UNMIK as an International Governance in post-war Kosova: NATO’s Intervention, UN Administration and Kosovar Aspirations, LogosA, 2003, Shkup, fq. 146
[5] Naomi Winberger, “The Challenges in East Timor”, Journal of International Affairs, 15 janar 2001, fq. 6
[6] Paulo Gorjao, “The Legacy and Lessons of the United Nations Transnational Administration in East Timor”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 14 janar 2002, fq. 5
[7] Naomi Winberger, “The Challenges in East Timor”, Journal of International Affairs, 15 janar 2001, fq. 9
[8] Richard Caplan, “The Politics of International Administrations”, Global Governance, 3 tetor 2004, fq. 7
[9] Ibid. fq. 9
[10] Rob Jackson, ”International Engagement in War-Torn Countries”, Global Governance, 2 maj 2005, fq. 4
[11] David Harland, “Legitimacy and Effectiveness in International Administration”, Global Governance, 3 janar 2005, fq. 8
[12] Blerim Reka, Teoria dhe Praktika e Administrimit Ndërkombëtar, (skripta e autorizuar), fq. 51
[13] Ibid. fq. 25
[14] Ibid. fq. 74
[15] Anthony Lake, “Between War and Peace”, Harvard International Review, 25 maj 2004, fq. 12
[16] Blerim Reka, Teoria dhe Praktika e Administrimit Ndërkombëtar, (skripta e autorizuar), fq. 4
[17] Richard Caplan, “The Politics of International Administrations”, Global Governance, 3 tetor 2004, fq. 8
[18] Rob Jackson, ”International Engagement in War-Torn Countries”, Global Governance, 2 maj 2005, fq. 5
[19] Blerim Reka, Teoria dhe Praktika e Administrimit Ndërkombëtar, (skripta e autorizuar), fq. 52
[20] Richard Caplan, “The Politics of International Administrations”, Global Governance, 3 tetor 2004, fq. 9
[21] David Harland, “Peace in Bosnia”, New Zealand International Review, 22 maj 2004, fq. 8
[22] Arnold Beichman, “Exit Strategy Chorus”, The Washington Times, 4 shkurt 2005, fq. 3
[23] James Hamill, “Exit Strategy Delusions”, Parameters, 15 maj 2005, fq. 7
[24] Blerim Reka, Teoria dhe Praktika e Administrimit Ndërkombëtar, (skripta e autorizuar), fq. 52
[25] Donald K. Emmerson, “Moralpolitik: The Timor Test”, The National Interest, 5 shkurt 2002, fq. 13
[26] Blerim Reka, Teoria dhe Praktika e Administrimit Ndërkombëtar, (skripta e autorizuar), fq. 52
[27] Rob Jackson, ”International Engagement in War-Torn Countries”, Global Governance, 2 maj 2005, fq. 4
[28] Paulo Gorjao, “The Legacy and Lessons of the United Nations Transnational Administration in East Timor”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 14 janar 2002, fq. 6

Bibliografia

Blerim Reka, Teoria dhe Praktika e Administrimit Ndërkombëtar, (skripta e autorizuar).
Blerim Reka, UNMIK as an International Governance in post-war Kosova: NATO’s Intervention, UN Administration and Kosovar Aspirations, LogosA, 2003, Shkup.



Burime nga Libraria On-line: Questia Media America, Inc. http://www.questia.com/

John O’Sullivan, “How to Gain Legitimacy in Iraq”, National Review, 3 maj 2004.
Naomi Winberger, “The Challenges in East Timor”, Journal of International Affairs, 15 janar 2001.
Paulo Gorjao, “The Legacy and Lessons of the United Nations Transnational Administration in East Timor”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 14 janar 2002.
Richard Caplan, “The Politics of International Administrations”, Global Governance, 3 tetor 2004.
Rob Jackson, ”International Engagement in War-Torn Countries”, Global Governance, 2 maj 2005.
David Harland, “Legitimacy and Effectiveness in International Administration”, Global Governance, 3 janar 2005.
Anthony Lake, “Between War and Peace”, Harvard International Review, 25 maj 2004.
Arnold Beichman, “Exit Strategy Chorus”, The Washington Times, 4 shkurt 2005.
Donald K. Emmerson, “Moralpolitik: The Timor Test”, The National Interest, 5 shkurt 2002.

Analysis of the Research: “Gender Bias in Newspaper Profiles of 1996 Olympic Athletes: A Content of Five Major Dailies”

Introduction

The media, since its founding, have protected and constantly cultivated the gender stereotypes. The image of women that has been presented by the media, in general, is of weak, childish, dependent, domestic, irrational, subordinate creatures, the producers of children and little else compared with men.[1] Perhaps the area where these sexist representations dominated more than anywhere else is the sport; media’s coverage of sports historically has been dominated by sexist representations.

In this background, Katherine Kinnick has made a study regarding the Gender Bias in Newspaper Profiles of 1996 Olympic Athletes. In order to do this, she did the content analyses of five mayor daily newspapers: USA Today, The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, The Washington Post, and The Atlanta Constitution. The findings of her study were that, “There was no evidence of gender bias in terms of quantitative representation of female athletes, or in the placement and prominence of stories. Overall, the findings suggest improvement–revealing less egregious bias than has been noted by previous studies of media coverage of female athletes”.[2]

This essay will aim to explain that a) Kinnick underestimates different forms of gender bias in sports’ journalism while she explains the findings of her research (i.e. a focus on appearance, characterizations of weakness, and linguistic sexism), b) the Kinnick’s research, more or less, is characterized by fallacy of evidence; it makes generalizations, since “recognition is a necessary condition for legitimation to occur, but not a sufficient one”,[3] and c) the ‘positive’ changes represented on Kinnick’s research are just a blip on the screen that coincides with the Olympic Games – the representation of female athletes by the media was and continues to be hegemonic.


Highlighting Recognition and Neglecting Respect

Different scholars, while studying gender and race bias in media content, in general, focus on two primary criteria identified by Clark (1972)[4]: recognition (the first stage of legitimation), or the quantitative presence of the group of interest (in our case female athletes in comparison with their representation in the population); and, respect (the second stage of legitimation) the treatment and status accorded to this group.

Kinnick’s research is focused on these two criteria also. In the beginning, according to Kinnick, studies of gender in sports coverage show a consistent pattern relating to recognition (representation): “Female athletes receive disproportionately less coverage than male athletes”.[5] However, according to Kinnick, in Olympics of 1996 this negative trend ends; moreover, “In some cases, such as page layout and article prominence, female athletes received favorable treatment, suggesting that editors sought to capitalize on reader interest in female athletes”.[6]

Concerning the respect, which presents the second stage of legitimation, Kinnick, reveals the common sources of bias which contribute to recurring themes of trivialization and devaluation. What is more, she groups these sources of bias into three categories: a focus on appearance, characterizations of weakness, and linguistic sexism.[7]

Interesting thing is that, while Kinnick discusses the findings of her study, she focuses, above all, on recognition or the quantitative presence of the female athletes in comparison with their representation in the population. On the other hand, Kinnick, more or less, neglects the respect, which is very important, since media may recognize certain female athletes, in certain sports, by mentioning them, but the way these female athletes are presented might disrespect and de-legitimize them. Kinnick only numbers the cases and does not analyze them. Perhaps this is an outcome of quantitative analysis, which represents the only method that has been used by Kinnick. If Kinnick would have done qualitizing of the data (Qualitizing refers to a process by which quantitative data are transformed into qualitative data),[8] she probably would have come to different results.

The qualitizing of the data makes possible avoidance of the generalizations, since the aim of qualitative analysis is a complete detailed description. The lack of qualitative analysis of data might cause the miss of contextual details. More over, if we deal with an important issue such as gender bias in the media, the qualitizing of the data is an imperative of time, since there are new ways of covering the gender bias in the media; these ways appear to be more sophisticated, less visible and camouflaged. Contemporary mediated representations of female athletes function hegemonically in more sophisticated and thus more powerful ways than the traditionally ways of representing the female athletes.[9]

The following examples of some gender bias forms (i.e. a focus on appearance and characterizations of weakness) show in the best way that the use of exclusively quantitative analysis might offer a wrong generalized impression of female athlete representations – the trap into which, Kinnick has fallen.

Relay runner Dannete Young-Stone is described as “a beauty manicurist with braided hair”, in an article that focuses its first two and a half paragraphs on the nail salon she owns, rather than her role as an Olympic athlete. (The Atlanta Constitution, July 31, 1996)

Gold metal swimmer Michelle Smith was described as “freckle-faced” with “light green Irish eyes… She is one feisty lady.” (USA Today, July 26, 1996)

Juliana Furtado, a well known athlete, was described as “a sports cover girl”. (The Atlanta Constitution, July 30, 1996)

Michelle Smith, among others, was described as “a lass”. (Los Angeles Times, July 21, 1996)

Judo star Ryoko Tamura was depicted as “a national darling” and “a pixie”. (The Atlanta Constitution, July 26, 1996)

The description of Amanda Beard, fourteen years old swimmer, was a very tough one: “With her big blue eyes and toothy smile, Beard is as cute as the teddy bear she carries to the pool”. (The Atlanta Constitution, July 23, 1996)


These descriptions frame the athlete as something to be gazed upon for others’ pleasure, and minimize their identity as athletes. Interestingly, Kinnick recognizes these forms of gender bias and describes them as “exceptions to the positive changes for women”. Maybe they are ‘exceptions’, who knows, but one thing is for sure, the focus on female athletes’ appearance and the characterizations of weakness, observed in previous studies is similar as in these examples.

Traditional conceptions of sports are related to the definition of masculinity in U.S. culture;[10] and, media continuously have cultivated these conceptions. Moreover, in the beginning, women’s participation in athletics, by the media, was viewed as a social anomaly. “If masculinity and femininity are viewed as appropriate social conceptions... If sport is logically deduced as a masculine domain, as media presents it, then the role of woman in sport is a social anomaly”.[11]

While time passes some things change for real; there is no doubt that the Olympics of 1996 present a positive transformation, at least, in terms media coverage of female representations. However, Kinnick exaggerates these positive changes; she suggests that there was no evidence of gender bias during Olympics. This is a consequence of highlighting recognition (as a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one) and neglecting the respect. On the other hand, some scholars disagree with her; one of them is Clasen: “In the summer of 1996, I spent countless hours watching the Olympic Games as well as interviews with the athletes on talk shows. On talk shows, I saw women discussing their hopeful modeling careers and families. It seemed ironic to me that women’s athletic performances became secondary to their outside interests, particularly when those interests seemed to reinforce traditional feminine roles”.[12]

Although, there were some improvements, the sports, in U.S. are still considered, by the media, as a masculine social environment. “The masculine/feminine dualism pervades U.S. sports journalism. By placing masculinity and femininity on opposite ends of a dichotomy, women have been excluded from the sporting world, because sports are defined by masculine characteristics. Being feminine is paradoxical to being athletic”.[13]


Conclusion

To conclude, Katherine Kinnick has made a study regarding the Gender Bias in Newspaper Profiles of 1996 Olympic Athletes. The findings of her study were that, “there was no evidence of gender bias in terms of quantitative representation of female athletes, or in the placement and prominence of stories. Overall, the findings suggest improvement–revealing less egregious bias than has been noted by previous studies of media coverage of female athletes”.[14]

Regarding the recognition (representation) of female athletes, I agree, that there are some improvement; however, as I argued, the use of only quantitative analysis might give a wrong impression of representation (exaggerate findings), since the new ways of gender bias are more sophisticated, less visible and camouflaged. The qualitizing of the data is essential, if we want to present factual situation about gender bias in the media. On the other hand, concerning the general improvements of media coverage of female athletes, that Kinnick suggests, I dispute her completely. On the contrary, as it’s shown, the ‘positive’ changes represented on Kinnick’s research are just a blip on the screen that coincides with the Olympic Games; the representation of female athletes by the media was and continues to be hegemonic.

Lastly, a suggestion for future researches would be to examine a larger sample of newspapers and to use both quantitative and qualitative methods. Qualitizing of the data is necessary, since respect (as the second stage of legitimation) is essential in order to determine the factual situation on media coverage of female athletes; as Clark would say: “Without recognition, legitimation is impossible, but it alone is no guarantee that legitimation will occur”.[15]

Notes:

[1]Lucy Kosimar, Women in a Sexist Society, Basic , New York, 1971, pp. 301-305.
[2] Katherine N. Kinnick, “Gender Bias in Newspaper Profiles of 1996 Olympic Athletes: A Content of Five Major Dailies”, in journal: Women’s Studies in Communication. Vol. 21, No. 2/1998
[3] Cedric Clark, “Race, Identification and Television Violence”, in book: George A. Comstock, John P. Murray and Eli A. Rubinstein, eds., Television and Social Behavior: Reports and Papers, National Institute of Mental Health, Rockville, 1972, p. 125.
[4] Cedric Clark, “Race, Identification and Television Violence”, in book: George A. Comstock, John P. Murray and Eli A. Rubinstein, eds., Television and Social Behavior: Reports and Papers, National Institute of Mental Health, Rockville, 1972, pp. 123-127.
[5] Katherine N. Kinnick, “Gender Bias in Newspaper Profiles of 1996 Olympic Athletes: A Content of Five Major Dailies”, in journal: Women’s Studies in Communication. Vol. 21, No. 2/1998
[6] Ibid.
[7] Katherine N. Kinnick, “Gender Bias in Newspaper Profiles of 1996 Olympic Athletes: A Content of Five Major Dailies”, in journal: Women’s Studies in Communication. Vol. 21, No. 2/1998
[8] Margarete Sandelowski, “Focus on Research Methods: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Sampling, Data Collection, and Analysis Techniques in Mixed Methods Studies”, in journal: Research in Nursing and Health. Vol. 23, No. 1/2000
[9] Helene A. Shugart, “She Shoots, She Scores: Media Constructions of Contemporary Female Athletes in Coverage of 1999 U.S. Women’s Soccer Team”, in journal: Western Journal of Communication. Vol. 67, No. 1/2003
[10] Patricia R. W. Clasen, “The Female Athlete: Dualisms and Paradox in Practice”, in journal: Women and Language. Vol. 24, No. 2/2001
[11] Felshin, quoted in Patricia R. W. Clasen, “The Female Athlete: Dualisms and Paradox in Practice”, in journal: Women and Language. Vol. 24, No. 2/2001
[12] Patricia R. W. Clasen, “The Female Athlete: Dualisms and Paradox in Practice”, in journal: Women and Language. Vol. 24, No. 2/2001
[13] Ibid.
[14] Katherine N. Kinnick, “Gender Bias in Newspaper Profiles of 1996 Olympic Athletes: A Content of Five Major Dailies”, in journal: Women’s Studies in Communication. Vol. 21, No. 2/1998
[15] Cedric Clark, “Race, Identification and Television Violence”, in book: George A. Comstock, John P. Murray and Eli A. Rubinstein, eds., Television and Social Behavior: Reports and Papers, National Institute of Mental Health, Rockville, 1972, p. 125.

Bibliography


Katherine N. Kinnick, “Gender Bias in Newspaper Profiles of 1996 Olympic Athletes: A Content of Five Major Dailies”, in journal: Women’s Studies in Communication. Vol. 21, No. 2/1998
Lucy Kosimar, Women in a Sexist Society, Basic , New York, 1971
Margarete Sandelowski, “Focus on Research Methods: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Sampling, Data Collection, and Analysis Techniques in Mixed Methods Studies”, in journal: Research in Nursing and Health. Vol. 23, No. 1/2000
Helene A. Shugart, “She Shoots, She Scores: Media Constructions of Contemporary Female Athletes in Coverage of 1999 U.S. Women’s Soccer Team”, in journal: Western Journal of Communication. Vol. 67, No. 1/2003
Patricia R. W. Clasen, “The Female Athlete: Dualisms and Paradox in Practice”, in journal: Women and Language. Vol. 24, No. 2/2001Cedric Clark, “Race, Identification and Television Violence”, in book: George A. Comstock, John P. Murray and Eli A. Rubinstein, eds., Television and Social Behavior: Reports and Papers, National Institute of Mental Health, Rockville, 1972

The ‘Saint’ Man from my Neighborhood

It might sound funny, but be aware of the people who seem to be extremely honest. I suppose some of you remember the story of the man who on the end of his pants carried little bells. There was a village where have happened several robberies and nobody was ever arrested. All of the villagers were suspects except the man with little bells on the end of his pants; he was seen by the others as an angelic man on the earth.

When people asked him why he put those bells, he proudly answered: “I would not forgive to my self if I would step even a single insect; so, to avoid this tragedy that might happen while I walk, I have put these little bells down there. They serve as cautionary means”.

After a while a police patrol that came from the city to solve the case made ‘unforgivable mistake’; the police, by accident, did a foray of his house. A surprise has happened; every thing that has been stolen for many years was found inside of his house.

This was the story of the man with little bells on the end of his pants; now, let’s go back to reality. A year ago in my neighborhood happened something similar to this, except that, this was for real.

I have, actually I had a far neighbor, who has not left his house, when we escaped from Serbian forces on March 31, 1999. He was the only one who stayed home in our neighborhood.

When we came back, we found him alive. All of us, who escaped, were surprised. What is more, even his house seemed untouched; by the way, more than eighty percent of houses in my neighborhood were burned during the war. Of course, since no one of us was murdered we were more or less happy.

This man was the only eyewitness who might tell us what has happened, for more than two months, when we were in our houses. He told to a lot of people his, as he called them, enormous sufferings from terror.

When people asked him how he survived he answered: “It was not written for me to be dead. I thank God for the life that I have today. He took care of me because I didn’t do any thing harmful to anyone during my all life. I lived an honest life; but, I will be even more honest from now on”.

He started to become famous among the people. Most of them invited him in their banquets, marriages and circumcisions. He was in the focus of all conversations, which happened in these gatherings; moreover, he played the role of the preacher all the time.

Times were passing and my far neighbor became even wealthier. His ‘God’ was helping him in every sphere of the life.

But life, as always, reveals mysterious things. One day, during the summer of last year, while the ‘saint’ man was not there, his house took a flame. The people from neighborhood were trying to turn off the flame and to take out of the house the most valuable things.

During the rescuing action some people got inside of the undercroft and, they were surprised of what they have seen. The undercroft, a huge part, was filled with different things that our ‘saint’ neighbor has stolen from our houses while we were not there; and you know what, the dimensions of his undercroft were large, more than 100 square meter. Every thing was in there, TV’s, wash machines, curtains and video recorders.

As you see, ‘God’ didn’t make him rich, but the equipments that he stole from us; this was the end of my neighbor’s ‘sainthood’.

A few days after, a commission was founded, in order to distribute the equipment found in the house of our ‘saint’ neighbor, who we never saw again; his house was bought by another neighbor.

So, once more, be aware of the people who seem to be extremely honest. They really don’t exist; or, even if it seems that they exist, very soon, they will disappear, in the same way as my neighbor did.

Should Voting Rights be Reduced to Exclude Illiterate People?

Political consciousness and awareness, among others, should determine the voting rights. The voting reform, which would exclude illiterate people from the voting process, provides a chance for social and competent representatives, to be elected; it’s the only way that democracy could survive.

Literacy demands for voting are old, perhaps, as the concept of voting itself. Traditionally, the voting rights for illiterate people were considered as a very sensitive topic. Often, the literacy requirements for voting were described as political racism; as a method of ruling class to prevent different groups such as the poor, racial and ethnic minorities to be engaged in the voting process and accordingly to exclude them from the political life. Different examples from the past justify this form of thinking.

But now, things have changed; democracy as a form of governance can function only if the voters are informed about the political life. The rational explanation for the literacy demands, in our time, is that illiterate people are not sufficiently informed about the political candidates and their political programs; for that reason, they are not able to make a truly appropriate decision.

The voting rights should belong to the educated people who have political consciousness and responsiveness for the problems that preoccupy citizenry. In a country where, educated citizens are in the greater part and political consciousness is satisfactory, it is not very difficult for people to evaluate the policy of a particular party; it’s very easy to find out what is in the best interests of the people. On the other hand, if there is a lack of education and, as a result, the political consciousness is too low, people fail to understand the reality of the certain policy; they vote in favor of parties whose aims are different to the public interest.

The politically literate voter, unlike the illiterate one, is able to understand the real issues can effect on their lives and, the necessary changes to get a better government and wealthier life. In contrast, illiterate people may be influenced by the others, different manipulative groups. They could, without difficulty, be misled by wrong propaganda, and as such, they would be the victims of manipulation.

The democratic system includes participatory citizenry; that means citizens provide the government with ideas and suggestions how to govern. They may refute or initiate the certain law or policy with commencement of the citizens’ initiatives. The number of citizens that is needed to refute or initiate a law or a policy, in different states, depends on the number of citizens who are registered in ballot lists. Therefore, if illiterate people are out of these lists, it would be much easier to do such things, which are in the interests of public. Moreover, if the number of illiterates is huge, there is also a possibility to activate the initiatives of the citizens, but in a favor of certain interest group, and not in the benefit of the public.

To conclude, democracy can not succeed in countries where people are illiterate. The exclusion of the illiterate people from the ballot lists is needed for a democracy to succeed in being a governance of the people, by the people and for the people, and not the governance of some manipulative minority. So, in the name of establishing and consolidating of the democracy, illiterate people shouldn’t be in the voting lists.

Kosovo Status: Delay Represents a Danger Act

The political and social stability in Kosovo has been a lovely surprise during the last year. The hope of the citizens that the independence will come within 2006 has conditioned society to bring under control itself, even though the Kosovo’s population is going throughout difficult times (i.e. high level of unemployment, extreme poverty, the corruption of government’s officials and so on). In contrast to previous years, September has begun without education sector labor strikes; expressions of citizens’ anger about the government’s unnecessary spending on the interests of the officials are being delayed. Simply said, the status’ issue has determined a political and social stability in Kosovo.

The Ahtisaari’s decision to delay the settlement of Kosovo status for March has jeopardized this stability. In a report for Kosovo, International Crisis Group (ICG) says that the Kosovo final status process risks breaking down the longer a decision is pushed back into 2007. “Kosovo’s relative stability over the past year should not encourage the international community to imagine it has the luxury of waiting. The Contact Group must at minimum deliver timely endorsement of the settlement package that UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari should present before January’s end, and the UN Security Council must pass a resolution superseding 1244 to allow UNMIK to transfer its responsibilities to Kosovo’s government and pave the way for new international bodies being readied by the EU.” (International Crisis Group Europe Report No. 177, November 2006).

The reaction on the delay of Kosovo status settlement, were dissatisfied; the citizens and all political parties were disappointed. However, the politicians immediately called the citizens to act with maturity. “Kosovo Negotiations Team has called on the people of Kosovo to behave with dignity since the delay will not affect the substance aimed by the Kosovars for an independent and sovereign state” (Koha Ditore, November 11, 2006).

Even political parties were disappointed with Ahttisari’s decision to delay the settlement of Kosovo status. In this context, the daily Koha Ditore, reports about the statement issued by the Leading Council of the third biggest political party in Kosovo, AAK. “The statement says that the Kosovo Assembly should declare the independence of Kosovo and that the Team of Unity must dissolve.” (Koha Ditore, November 13, 2006).

On the other hand, the Kosovo government, which represents the coalition between LDK and AAK warned that “In case of indefinite postponements of status, the Government of Kosovo reserves the right to support any parliamentary initiative that aims at implementing the will of the Kosovo people” (Koha Ditore, November 11, 2006).

The Vetëvendosja movement reacted in interesting way. “Glauk Konjufca from the Vetëvendosja movement said that the postponement or no postponement of status was always a secondary issue for the movement. Vetëvendosja is interested in the content of the status package which, according to Konjufca, will be a substantial autonomy; in contrast to this, we will do everything that is possible in order to realize our national objectives” (Epoka e Re, November 11, 2006).

The delay of Kosovo status settlement presents a risky act; this will be shown, in the most visible way, through the violent demonstrations which have been organized in Prishtina, on November 28, 2006, by Vetëvendosja movement. “Protestors threw stones and solid ink bottles at Assembly, Government, and UNMIK and smashed window glasses. UNMIK Police used tear gas when protestors started to tear down walls against UNMIK HQ in Pristina.” (Kosova Sot, November 29, 2006).

Vandal celebration of Vetëvendosja, reports Koha Ditore on the front page. “Despite vandalism during the protest the only measure taken by the police was tear gas in front of UNMIK HQ and there have been no arrests. The international police had to protect the UN HQ in Kosovo with teargas after the attempt of the demonstrators to remove the concrete barricades around UNMIK’s main building.” (Koha Ditore, November 29, 2006).

The police warned participants of the demonstration organized by Vetëvendosja after they removed one of the barricades which surround the UNMIK building. However the protesters continued with their attempts to remove another barricade while the police tried to stop them. “The protesters started throwing stones and forced the police behind the concrete barricade to use teargas to disperse the protesters. Vetëvendosja movement had called for a nationwide peaceful protest with the motto “Against Negotiating Team, for protection of Kosovo”. Some thousands of citizens and political parties responded to their call.” (Koha Ditore, November 29, 2006).

The leader of Vetëvendosja movement, Albin Kurti was very angry on politicians during demonstrations. “These institutions do not represent our will because our will is not negotiating with Serbia,” Albin Kurti told the gathered crowd. He said the leaders of Kosovo are “trading independence”. “The activists of Vetëvendosja movement will now start to peacefully throw bottles of red paint at these institutions,” Kurti said.” (KTV, November 28, 2006).

On the aftermath of the violent protests, the leader of Vetëvendosja Movement said that every thing has gone in a way it was planned. Koha Ditore, on November 30, 2006 quoted Vetëvendosja leader Albin Kurti as saying that the protest went according to the scenario.

The protests organised by Vetëvendosja were violent and according to the international mission it threatened the lives of international staff members. “The police reacted only when the life threat happened and this happened in UNMIK headquarters.” (Iliria Post, November 30, 2006).

The Government of Kosovo also reacted saying that the Vetëvendosja protest has went beyond the limits of a peaceful demonstration. “The Government said that such acts of violence against government buildings were unacceptable and intolerable.” (Express, November 30, 2006).

In a press conference, organized by Vetëvendosja movement, Kurti sounded very threatening. “The Vetëvendosja leader said the protest on Flag Day was peaceful and he announced that the future demonstrations of the Movement would be even more powerful ‘in order to bring the situation to normal’.” (Express, November 30, 2006).

To end with, the postponement of the Kosovo status settlement has put in danger the social and political stability in the country. Kosovo was already threatened by a lot of troubles; the settlement of Kosovo status was considered as a beginning of resolving of the existing problems. The protests, organized by Vetëvendosja movement, illustrate the fragility of the peace in the country; they show that the stability in Kosovo is a very relative concept.

Politika dhe Politikanët: rasti i Kosovës

Politika, sipas Theodore Parker, është shkenca e urgjencës. Për Groucho Marx, ajo është arti i gjetjes së problemeve, diagnostifikimit të tyre, dhe aplikimit të zgjidhjeve të gabuara për problemet në fjalë. Në anën tjetër, Napoleon Bonaparta kishte thënë: në politikë, absurditeti nuk është pengesë.


Politika, stili kosovar

Politika, sipas modelit kosovar, mund të përshkruhet si, art i arteve dhe shkencë e shkencave. Ajo mashtron dhe ngatërron. Në punë të lartëson; në jetë të pasuron. Ironikisht, politika është i vetmi profesion ku mungesa e diturisë është më e mirë se vetë dituria. Politika tek ne është punë profitabile, ku truri dhe arsyeja e shëndoshë janë më së paku të nevojshëm.

Politika kosovare është e rastit dhe nuk ka strategji veprimi. Është përçarëse dhe ka prirje për të bërë hile. Nuk është unike as në momentet më kritike për ardhmërinë e kombit. Shpenzimet e saj janë enorme dhe nuk mund të justifikohen. Konceptet “e vërtetë“ dhe “gënjeshtër” janë të paqarta, të papërcaktuara dhe jorrallë ndërrohen me njëra-tjetrën. Politika tek ne paraqet një formë të shëmtuar të bixhozit ku nuk vlejnë rregullat. Shpeshherë, politika e përzier me gjuhën e urrejtjes gjeneron kriza të thella. Politika kosovare i simplifikon çështjet, i trivializon ato dhe fokusohet në personalitete, duke bërë njëkohësisht edhe hyjnizimin e tyre.


Politikanët

Politikanët tanë, me përjashtime të rralla, janë varietet i pafundëm, grup i paqëndrueshëm i diversiteteve dhe koleksion i kopjeve. Disa prej tyre janë individë amoral, që të padrejtën e proklamojnë si të drejtë. Shumë nga ta nuk kanë sens për humor; kur bosët politikanë janë të padisponuar, ashtu duhet të duken edhe pjesëtarët e eskortës së tyre. Ata mund të ndëshkojnë për padëgjueshmëri, por assesi nuk bën të kritikohen për këtë veprim.

Një numër i madh i politikanëve kosovarë merren me thashethëna dhe shpifje. Garën tradicionale të ideve rreth platformës së qeverisjes, ka kohë që e anashkalojnë. Tani, ata konkurrojnë dhe garojnë me premtime, shpresa apo parashikim të së ardhmes. Politikanët bëjnë joshjen e votuesve me projekte progresive, që në të vërtetë nuk janë asgjë tjetër veçse retorikë e zbrazët dhe shpresa iluzore. Të gjithë politikanët pajtohen për një gjë, e ajo është se nuk pajtohen për asgjë. E proklamojnë fuqishëm respektimin e institucioneve dhe ndarjen e pushteteve; në anën tjetër nuk i pranojnë vendimet e gjykatës më të lartë të vendit, nëse këto vendime nuk u përshtaten .

Fjalimet e shumicës së politikanëve tanë i karakterizon ambiguiteti dhe mungesa e logjikës. Fjalët e tyre janë, thënë me eufemizëm, metafora transparente që nuk i përkasin realitetit ekonomik dhe politik të vendit tonë. Për fushatën e paskrupullt që zhvillojnë kundër rivalëve politikë, lakmi do t’ua kishte edhe shefi i propagandës naciste Jozef Gebbels.

Politikanët tanë kurrë nuk kanë dëgjuar për fjalën kompromis. Paaftësia e tyre për të negociuar është tmerrësisht e madhe. Të gjithë duan t’i realizojnë qëllimet e tyre dhe ekskluzivisht qëllimet e tyre. Interesi publik është fjalë që ata e kuptojnë, por shumë e urrejnë; interesi personal është fjala që ata e preferojnë.

Mundësitë reale për të racionalizuar iracionalitetin e politikës kosovare, nëse ato ekzistojnë, janë shumë të vogla. Politika jonë është e dezorientuar dhe politikanët tanë të “jashtëzakonshëm” janë pafundësisht magjepsës dhe misterioz

Është koha e fundit që qytetarët e vendit tonë të mbledhin guximin për të ripërcaktuar racionalitetin dhe qëllimet e politikës që ndjekin politikanët tanë. Ky nuk është atdheu që e ëndërronim para disa viteve; qytetatët e rëndomtë dhe patriotët e vërtetë të këtij vendi me të drejtë pyesin: Quo vadis Kosovë?

Limits of the Mass Media vs. Freedom of Speech

Introduction

The basic principle of the mass media is the freedom from any government regulation and control that would imply censorship or limits on freedom of publication. The freedom of the press is often enshrined as a principle in national constitutions and international charters, such as the European Convention on Human Rights.[1] Nevertheless, there are some limits that characterize the activity of the mass media. Some of these limits, in particular limitation of hate speech, are result of the accountability. Consequently, they aren’t incompatible with media freedom, but are unavoidable components of the normal operating atmosphere of media in a healthy society.

This essay will aim to explain the following relationship: limits of the mass media vs. freedom of speech. In particular, it will elaborate the phenomenon of the hate speech and the other aspects of careless reporting (i.e. the difficulties faced while reporting on deadline, live, spontaneous). The essay will explain that the use of the hate speech by the media is typical for societies without a clear vision for their future. There are plenty of examples in the region who confirm this account. The use of the hate speech was present in Balkans before the NATO intervention in Kosovo. Serbian media have been the most influential regarding the wars in ex-Yugoslavia; they have used hate speech and promoted xenophobia, as forms of cultural violence,[2] against every nation from former Yugoslavia. This kind of speech, more or less, characterizes the Serbian media at this time;[3] it is in attendance, with a few exceptions, in the media of our country too.

The Use of the Hate Speech

Hate speech, as a form of a cultural violence, is defined as an expression that is abusive, insulting, intimidating, harassing, or which may incite to violence, hatred, or discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation.[4] The history of the media has shown that cultural violence, its forms, can provoke the other types of violence; said simply, the hate speech can really kill. In Rwanda, for instance, the radio has become like the voice of devil, telling Hutu people the ways of slaughtering Tutsi. Hutu media have broadcast live the speeches who called on Hutu to kill Tutsi;[5] this fact shows a direct link between hate speeches and murder.

It is known that in a post-conflict society, the public is very sensitive on media reports, especially biased ones. Biased reporting, associated with the hate speech, could lead to violence; the tragic events of March 2004 in Kosova show this undeniable truth. In fact, media coverage seems to have led to massive demonstration of a violent nature involving 50.000 – 60.000 people on 17 March, as compared to the 18.000 who have demonstrated prior to the coverage of this incident in the media.[6] It should also be noted that the media, in particular, RTK as the only public broadcaster, demonstrated intolerable levels of emotion, bias, negligence and falsely applied patriotic fanaticism linked with the hate speech; the public broadcaster promoted ‘patriotism’ instead of professionalism. There is no other way to interpret the words of the presenter of RTK, on Blic News at 23:00, 16 March: “Three Albanian children, Florent, Avni and Egzon are victims of an attack by a group of Serbian paramilitary in the village of Caber”.[7]

It is clear that the broadcasting sector, especially RTK, played the main role during the March events by broadcasting biased reports with full of hate speech. The print media also, with a few exceptions, have failed during their reporting. Most of the news about the children was presented on the front page. The daily Bota Sot had a very firebrand title on March 17; the title was: “Serb gangs have started their activities to expel Albanians from the north”.[8] It was not the first that the daily Bota Sot neglected Regulation 2000/4 on the Prohibition against Inciting to National, Racial or Ethnic Hatred. This daily newspaper was frequently criticized by OSCE and TMC for its inflammatory and prejudicial language.[9] In contrast, there was a newspaper that has displayed more constructive behavior and avoided the hate speech. Editorials and most of the reporting in the daily Koha Ditore helped to decrease tensions.[10]

Obviously, there is no journalist who can be absolutely objective. Journalists, like everyone, carry the values of their home country, their religion and their ethnic group.[11] That is why professional journalists have standards for truthfulness, fairness and responsibility, to eliminate their private values and bias;[12] in other words, to promote reliable journalism.

These principles, more than anywhere else, were neglected in Serbia, by Serbian media; Serbian media can be considered as a supporter of the cultural violence, in particular the hate speech. Since the late 1980s till now, the Serbian media have abandoned these standards and continually promoted the ubiquitous slogan “All Serbs in One State”,[13] which is nothing else except a call for the war against the other nations in ex-Yugoslavia. The Serbian media campaign against the other nations has begun with “The Serbian Cultural Revolution” of 1986 to 1989.[14] From that moment, the Serbian journalists were under political pressure to support the nationalism of the Milosevic’s government; they were also under social pressure to join the patriotic euphoria. Those who resisted, if any, were demoted or dismissed. Serbian media was the greatest propaganda machine of all the times. By using the hate speech and promoting xenophobia, they blamed the others for the problems, difficulties and sufferings that Serbian people ever faced; for these doings, even the Nazi-propaganda chief, Josef Goebels would admire them.

RTS (Radio Television of Serbia) was the most important news medium and held a monopoly on state-wide broadcasting.[15] The party-state of Milosevic kept RTS in an iron grasp. Milosevic, for sure, has never read Marshal McLuhan’s best-selling book The Medium is the Message, or Maxwell McCombs’ handbook The Agenda-Setting Role of the Mass Media in the Shaping of the Public Opinion. However, he has grasped better than anyone the function of the mass media and of television in particular: he has known that there is nothing except national TV, and that on national TV there is nothing except the 7:30 evening news; it is there that the consensus of public opinion is formed.[16]

The RTS used a very tendentious language and tone while covering the war in Croatia and Bosnia. The emphasis in RTS coverage was on the defensive nature of Serb activity; the Serbs were “fighting for freedom”, protecting their “national soul” from “the Muslims”, who were waging the religious war, and wanted to force Serbs to belong to an Islamic state, and from “the Croats”, who wanted to unite with Croatia, and whose anti-Serb fascism was already known.[17]

The terminology of Serbian journalists to describe their enemies was a very tough one. These journalists have used very controversial terms such as: “evil doers”, “cut throats”, “ustashe”, “mujahedin”, “jihad warriors”, “Muslim extremists”, and so on.[18] Radivoje Gutic, a Serbian journalist, reporting from Herzegovina for RTS, said, “Croatian and Muslim forces want to destroy everything Serbian in these areas. Terror, fanatical hatred, and physical and spiritual genocide against Serbs in Herzegovina are the basis of their political and military effort”.[19]

The RTS had a very interesting way of selecting the studio guests. Program guests are often presented without explaining who they are and who they represent; of course, these guests have to use always the hate speech against the others. On 5 November 1992, a Russian general was given the chance to avow that Russian officers were ready to intervene militarily on the side of their Orthodox brothers against Muslim fundamentalists and Croatian fascists, not mentioning the fact that the general was retired and represented only himself.[20] The way that RTS has operated in Serbia, the way of using the hate speech, as a form of cultural violence, to eliminate the others and manipulate with the Serbian public is unknown in the newest history of the media; it can be considered like the best way to degrade the media’s role.


What do the People of the Media Think?

People of the media have very interesting opinions about these limits of the mass media. “Speaking badly about the other ethnic or cultural group, or shortly, using the hate speech represents the worst way of doing the journalists’ job. Journalists, like everyone, belong to the certain ethnic and cultural group, but above all, they are human beings and should not incite the violence against the others”, says, Mrs. Arta Demaj, the editor in Radio Dukagjini, responsible for news. “On the contrary, good journalism encourages negotiations if there is a conflict between different ethnic groups. Therefore, journalists should always produce the reports which are impartial and balanced”.

The other sort of limitation, which is typical for societies without a tradition of the free press, is censorship. It refers to the control by public authorities of any form of publication or transmission, usually some mechanism of examining all material before publication.[21]

“We have over-passed the traditional form of the censorship, the one realized by the state. At the present, we are facing a new type of this phenomenon; the censorship exercised by media owners”, says Mr. Hivzi Krasniqi, the editor in daily Iliria Post. “The owners are interested to make money or propaganda or both. Consequently, the probability of an event to become news, if it is harmful for the sponsors or investors, is none”.

According to Mr. Krasniqi, the newest kind of censorship is even worst than the older form. “The censorship exercised by the media owners has too many filters”, says he.


The Other Challenges of Reporting

News is a construct: it is a version of reality shaped in significant part by journalistic reports.[22] Although, while doing their job, journalists face a lot of difficulties, they should be very careful, in particular, while reporting live and on deadline.

Deadline reporting, especially if you’re covering mayor breaking news event, creates enormous competitive situations. These stories can make you a famous journalist; but, they can destroy you also. While reporting on deadline journalists should be very careful on few things. Firstly, the most essential standard is the quantity of accurate, timely information they give to the public;[23] the deadline is coming and journalists should gather truthful information as much as they can. Secondly, they should be aware of clearness and reasonableness of their reporting;[24] reporting has to be clear and understandable. Thirdly, the reporting should be characterized by creativity and credible sources;[25] journalists should be resourceful and creative while pursuing the news. So, while reporting on deadline, journalists should maintain the balance in their coverage as they worked to beat the deadline.

As deadline reporting, live reporting can be an interesting and enlightening, but also a very risky activity for the journalists. Live reporting requires us to step back for a moment, take a deep professional breath, collect ourselves and then begin the process of deciding what information our viewers, or listeners need to receive first. Journalists’ live reporting must offer a calm, reasoned and balanced view of the event; otherwise, they will be covered with the veil of un-professionalism.


Conclusion

To conclude, while doing their job, journalists face some limitations which are not incompatible with the freedom of speech; moreover, some of these limits, in particular, limitation of the hate speech, can produce good journalism. In ex-Yugoslavia, the media has shown itself as a double-edged sword. It can be a dreadful weapon of brutality when it transmits messages of fanaticism linked with the hate speech. This type of messages, full of hate speech, broadcasted by the Serbian media, legitimized the belief that genocide was an appropriate self-defense initiative and, hundreds of thousands people were slaughtered in ex-Yugoslavia.

However, there is another aspect of the media. It can be an instrument of peace-building when the information which is presented is reliable and unbiased. It’s the sort of the media that neglects the hate speech; it seeks solutions, since “good journalism is, above all, a constant process of seeking solutions”,[26] and not inciting conflicts.

Notes:

[1] Denis McQuail, Mass Communication Theory, London, SAGE Publication, 2005, Pg. 236.
[2] Cultural violence includes: hate speech; xenophobia; myths and legends of war heroes; religious justification of the war; and gender discrimination. For more information see: Ross Howard, “Conflict Sensitive Journalism”, a handbook.
[3] Agneza Bozic-Roberson, “Words before the War: Milosevic’s Use of the Media Band Rhetoric to Provoke Ethno-political Conflict in Former Yugoslavia”, East European Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 4/2004
[4] Jae-Jin Lee, “Hate Speech as a Communicative Phenomenon: Another View on Campus Speech Code Issues”, Communication and the Law, Vol. 19, No. 2/1997
[5] Dina Temple-Raston, “Journalism and Genocide: How Much Freedom Press is Too Much”, American Journalism Review, Vol. 34, No. 5/1999
[6] OSCE Report: The Role of the Media in the March 2004 Events in Kosovo. Pg. 3.
[7] Ibid. Pg. 8.
[8] OSCE Report: The Role of the Media in the March 2004 Events in Kosovo. Pg. 14.
[9] Julie Mertus and Mark Thompson, “The Learning Curve: Media Development in Kosovo”, American Journalism Review, Vol. 24, N0. 8/2002
[10] Ibid. Pg. 3.
[11] Ross Howard, “Conflict Sensitive Journalism”, a handbook, Pg. 19.
[12] Ibid. Pg. 14.
[13] Agneza Bozic-Roberson, “Words before the War: Milosevic’s Use of the Media Band Rhetoric to Provoke Ethno-political Conflict in Former Yugoslavia”, East European Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 4/2004
[14] Agneza Bozic-Roberson, “Words before the War: Milosevic’s Use of the Media Band Rhetoric to Provoke Ethno-political Conflict in Former Yugoslavia”, East European Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 4/2004
[15] International Centre Against Censorship, The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Article 19. Pg. 84.
[16] Ibid. Pg. 86.
[17] Agneza Bozic-Roberson, “Words before the War: Milosevic’s Use of the Media Band Rhetoric to Provoke Ethno-political Conflict in Former Yugoslavia”, East European Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 4/2004
[18] International Centre Against Censorship, The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Article 19. Pg. 102.
[19] Ibid. Pg. 103.
[20] Ibid. Pg. 113.
[21] Denis McQuail, Mass Communication Theory, London, SAGE Publication, 2005, Pg. 549.
[22] Thomas E. Patterson, “Political Roles of the Media”, American Journalism Review, Vol. 49, N0. 9/2003
[23] Ferrell Wellman, “Standards under Pressure”, American Journalism Review, Vol. 32, N0. 4/2003
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ross Howard thinks that “Good Journalism is a Process of Seeking Solutions”. For more information see: Ross Howard, “Conflict Sensitive Journalism”, a handbook, Pg. 9.

Bibliography

McQuail, Denis. Mass Communication Theory, London: SAGE Publication, 2005.
Bozic-Roberson, Agneza. “Words before the War: Milosevic’s Use of the Media Band Rhetoric to Provoke Ethno-political Conflict in Former Yugoslavia”, East European Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 4/2004
Lee, Jae-Jin. “Hate Speech as a Communicative Phenomenon: Another View on Campus Speech Code Issues”, Communication and the Law, Vol. 19, No. 2/1997
Temple-Raston, Dina. “Journalism and Genocide: How Much Freedom Press is Too Much”, American Journalism Review, Vol. 34, No. 5/1999
OSCE Report: The Role of the Media in the March 2004 Events in Kosovo
Mertus, Julie & Mark Thompson. “The Learning Curve: Media Development in Kosovo”, American Journalism Review, Vol. 24, N0. 8/2002
International Centre Against Censorship. “The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina”, Article 19
Patterson, Thomas E. “Political Roles of the Media”, American Journalism Review, Vol. 49, N0. 9/2003
Howard, Ross. “Conflict Sensitive Journalism”, a handbook Wellman, Ferrell. “Standards under Pressure”, American Journalism Review, Vol. 32, N0. 4/2003

The Watchdog Role of the Media - Media as the Fourth Estate

Introduction

The watchdog conception, according to which, the media is supposed to serve as a controller of government, is one among the oldest main beliefs in journalism. The term ‘fourth estate’, the press’ role in being a ‘watchdog’ that will control the government was reputedly coined by Edmund Burke, in late-eighteenth century in England to refer to the political power possessed by the press of that time, on a same level with the other three ‘estates’ of power in the British realm: Lords, Church and Commons.[1] In the beginning, the idea of the press as the ‘fourth estate’ was considered as an independent check on the activities of the state, particularly government. On the other hand, the development of the watchdog role goes further than the borders of government investigation to take account of many other institutions of societal power, including powerful individuals, who may have no official relationship with public office.

This essay will aim to explain the ‘watchdog’ role of the media; in particular it will deal with issues like: Social Responsibility Theory, current trends of media agenda setting, and how media fulfills its role in the society and how it helps opinion make wise and informed decisions. In countries where democracy is fragile, there is less emphasis on the ‘watchdog’ role of the media; circumstances dictate such a thing. On the other hand, in the democratic countries, in the societies with a high level of political culture, the ‘watchdog’ role of the media is highlighted very strongly. Media are considered as a ‘fourth estate’, as a powerful ‘watchdog’, which is used for revealing mistreatments of state authority, in particular protecting the democratic and constitutional rights of the citizens. However, with the slow, but stable, decline of the public’s belief in the mass media,[2] it is contentious whether the ‘watchdog’ role of the media is still undamaged. The essay will prove that media still remains ‘watchdog’, the ‘fourth estate’ that, more or less, realizes its responsibilities toward society.


Social Responsibility Theory

The Social Responsibility Theory is one among other press theories; some say, there are four theories, the others say that there are really just two theories of the press, Authoritarian and Libertarian, which the latter two theories, Social Responsibility and Soviet Communist are merely extensions of.[3] Nevertheless, the Social Responsibility Theory is very important one; it is considered as a theory that should serve to the achievement of valid societal goals. According to this theory, the media have responsibilities toward society; the media should be available to more than a marginal group of people and present more than the opinions of influential politicians. Therefore, the essence of the Social Responsibility Theory is an affirmative role in advocating social justice for general public, which are powerless.

The social responsibility tradition that received its philosophical basis in the American commission of 1947 was actually put into practice with much more determination and effects in countries other than the United States, especially in Western Europe in the two or three decades following the Second World War.[4] The idea was to put order in media’s scene of the Europe; it was a post-war period and Europe needed, more than any thing else, an accountable media that will act responsibly toward demands of society, it will promote a social justice. In a way, for the media, social responsibility should be always a main concern.

The social responsibility model involved a number of ways in which the state could attempt to play a role in attempting to ensure that media fulfills their social obligations whilst at the same time trying, more or less, to retain the independence of the journalism and the freedom of the speech.[5] Mass media should provide citizens with information. They should identify the problems in our society, and unlawful activities of those who have power. Media also should have mobilization function, campaigning for societal purposes in the area of politics and economic development. So, everywhere, social tasks come prior to media rights and freedoms.

The social responsibility model suggests that among others: the media have obligations to society; news media should be truthful, fair, objective and relevant; the media should be free, but self-regulated; the media should follow agreed codes of ethics and professional conducts.[6] According to this, the media in Kosovo and in the region, with a few exceptions, are not respecting the bases of the Social Responsibility Theory. For instance, the daily Bota Sot, deals more with untruthful accusations than with news (i.e. during the national elections before two years daily Bota Sot has written about Mr. Veton Surroi and his ‘marriage’ with the sister of Xhoana Nano-the wife of former Prime Minister, Mr. Fatos Nano).

On the other hand, the Public Television of Kosova (RTK) deals more with unimportant issues than with important ones. People acquire factual information about public affairs from television news, but they also learn how much importance to attach to a topic on the basis of emphasis placed on it in the news. If the first story on the newscast is unimportant one, if the length of time dedicated to the salient story is too short, as RTK is doing there is no way to fulfill tasks toward the public. By calling attention to the secondary matters, while ignoring the important ones, RTK is not fulfilling its responsibilities to citizens of Kosova.

According to the Social Responsibility Theory, socially responsible media also should represent the public and speak for and to the public interest in order to hold government accountable.[7] So, the media should be considered as ‘watchdog’ that the public rely on for revealing errors and wrongdoing by governmental institutions. The Public Television has never revealed even one illegal act, which is done by governmental institutions, and, of course, there are plenty of them. On the other hand, there are some media, socially responsible, that represent the public interest. One of them is daily Koha Ditore; this daily newspaper has revealed a lot of unlawful activities of politicians. A few days ago this newspaper, Koha Ditore has revealed a latest scandal of Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports, Mr. Astrit Haraqia. The Minister Haraqia has engaged the Italian songstress with Albanian origin to sing for his birthday; every thing has been paid from the money of Kosovo’s tax-payers.

Even in United States, the first constitutional democracy in the world, there are a lot of cases when different forms of media fail to cover issues in a socially responsible manner. For instance, the Nevada Daily Mail, while writing about an investment of Murphy Farms in their city, represented it as a family farm instead of a corporate giant run by Wendell Murphy, an influential former state legislator who is actively involved in gaining agricultural exemptions from state sales taxes; and environmental regulations.[8] Therefore, readers were told not only that family farm had arrived but that the arrival involved potentially controversial issues, such as problems with environment. As a result this investment was not done, since it was not allowed by citizens. By doing this, Nevada Daily Mail didn’t fulfill its tasks to citizens, and later was accused by them for misinformation.[9]

On the other hand, the media’s scene of United States is full of examples where media cover issues in a socially responsible way; it remains a ‘watchdog’ that reveals bad behavior of politicians and in this way fulfills its responsibilities to public. Watergate and the Pentagon Papers were issues of national scope in which a more powerful executive branch of government threw its weight against the media’s ‘watchdog’ legacy; although there have been mixed reviews on the media’s role in these incidents, most authorities writing on that time identify these challenges as the media’s finest exercise of the ‘watchdog’ function.[10]


Current Trends of Media Agenda Setting

Agenda setting is a highly political process: political actors actively seek to bring issues on top of the agenda if they are looking for a change of policy, or to keep them off the agenda if they want to defend the status quo.[11] The function of the media in this process is essential since they determine which issues are the most important ones; agenda setting illustrates a very powerful authority of the media – the capability to inform the public what topics are important.

Two basis assumptions underlie most research on agenda-setting: (1) the press and the media do not reflect reality; they filter and shape it; (2) media concentration on a few issues and subjects leads the public to perceive those issues as more important than other issues.[12] First of all, media do not represent certainty; there are filters inside of the media, which decide what is ‘real’ and what is ‘false’. In other words, every thing passes through the filters of the media and after that it will be presented to the public; agenda setting is the process that lets some information to reach the audience while other information is kept out. Secondly, different forms of the media tell us which issues are worthy of our attention; or, as Bernard Cohen stated: “The press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about”.[13]

The power of the news media to set a nation’s agenda, to focus public attention on a few key public issues, is an immense and well–documented influence.[14] Do the media in our country and in the region do such a thing? Of course, there are some media in our country that really set an agenda; however, a lot of them do not set an agenda. Among those media that do not set an agenda is our Public Television (RTK); Public Television of Kosova is characterized by an absence of power to set an agenda, to focus attention on a few important public issues. If most of the stories on the newscast are less important ones, if the length of time dedicated to the main story, if any, is too short, as RTK is performing, there is no chance to set an agenda. Besides, RTK deals more with irrelevant issues; consequently, Public Television remains a surrogate media, which doesn’t fulfill its tasks to public.

United States are known as a country where media set an agenda; this happens always, especially, during the elections. During these political races there is rarely evening news that goes by without having something about the city races, congressional races, and the presidential race.[15] Political debates and presidential news has always flooded the headlines and newscasts during the elections. These issues always are essential and everyone talks about the candidates and their programs. It happens like this since the media leads the public to believe that this is important. As McCombs and Shaw stated, “We judge as important what the media judge as important”.[16]


Conclusion

To conclude, the most important role of the media is that of ‘watchdog’, regular and independent inspection of those in power, including, supply of trustworthy information about their activities. The main concern to the watchdog role is to do the investigative journalism. By doing this, the media consider themselves as a representative of the wide public, and of course, the opponent of government. Media representatives have this right as members of the ‘fourth estate” – their role is to keep an eye on politicians on behalf of the public. This role of the media, the ‘watchdog’ role, is essential if citizens want to hold public officials accountable for their actions. Although, there is a small decline of public’s beliefs in the mass media,[17] they still remain a ‘fourth estate’. Media perform its ‘watchdog’ role and in this way fulfills its tasks toward public; otherwise, the scandals mentioned above and unmentioned ones would always remain unrevealed.





Notes:

[1] Denis McQuail, Mass Communication Theory, London, SAGE Publication, 2005, Pg. 169.
[2] Gerald C. Stone & Mary K. O’Donnell, “Public Perceptions of Newspaper’s Watchdog Role”, Newspaper Research Journal, Vol. 18, N0. 1-2/1997.
[3] Vincent Campbell, Information Age of Journalism, London, Hodder, 2004, Pg. 32.
[4] Denis McQuail, Mass Communication Theory, London, SAGE Publication, 2005, Pg. 169.
[5] Vincent Campbell, Information Age of Journalism, London, Hodder, 2004, Pg. 36.
[6] Denis McQuail, Mass Communication Theory, London, SAGE Publication, 2005, Pg. 172.
[7] Kristie Bunton, “Social Responsibility in Covering Community: a Narrative Case Analyses”, Journal of Mass Media Ethics, Vol. 13, N0. 4/1998.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Kristie Bunton, “Social Responsibility in Covering Community: a Narrative Case Analyses”, Journal of Mass Media Ethics, Vol. 13, N0. 4/1998.
[10] Gerald C. Stone & Mary K. O’Donnell, “Public Perceptions of Newspaper’s Watchdog Role”, Newspaper Research Journal, Vol. 18, N0. 1-2/1997.
[11] Sebastian Princen, Agenda Setting in the European Union, Paper prepared for the NIG Annual Conference, Nijmegen, 11 November 2005.
[12] Paul Weyrich, “TV Network Creates New Link between Citizens, Politicians”, Insight on the News, Vol. 10, N0.4/1994.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Maxwell McCombs, The Agenda Setting Role of the Mass–media in Shaping the Public Opinion (The handbook of Naser Miftari).
[15] Brian Gittinger, “Agenda Setting Function Examples and Applications”, Insight on the News, Vol. 5/1994.
[16] Brian Gittinger, “Agenda Setting Function Examples and Applications”, Insight on the News, Vol. 5/1994.
[17] Gerald C. Stone & Mary K. O’Donnell, “Public Perceptions of Newspaper’s Watchdog Role”, Newspaper Research Journal, Vol. 18, N0. 1-2/1997.

Bibliography

McQuail, Denis. Mass Communication Theory, London: SAGE Publication, 2005.
Stone, Gerald C. & Mary K. O’Donnell. “Public Perceptions of Newspaper’s Watchdog Role”, Newspaper Research Journal, Vol. 18, N0. 1-2/1997.
Campbell, Vincent. Information Age of Journalism, London: Hodder, 2004.
Bunton, Kristie. “Social Responsibility in Covering Community: a Narrative Case Analyses”, Journal of Mass Media Ethics, Vol. 13, N0. 4/1998.
Princen, Sebastian. Agenda Setting in the European Union, Paper prepared for the NIG Annual Conference, Nijmegen, 11 November 2005.
Gittinger, Brian. “Agenda Setting Function Examples and Applications”, Insight on the News, Vol. 5/1994.
McCombs, Maxwell. The Agenda Setting Role of the Mass–media in Shaping the Public Opinion (The handbook given by Naser Miftari).Weyrich, Paul. “TV Network Creates New Link between Citizens, Politicians”, Insight on the News, Vol. 10, N0.4/1994.

Zhvillimi Social dhe Politika Sociale e Bashkësisë Europiane

Arta Demaj, MA

Hyrje

Qëllimi i këtij punimi konsiston në eksplikimin (shpjegimin) e politikës sociale në Unionin Europian. Do të tentohet të paraqitet një pasqyrë e qartë rreth asaj se si ishte politika sociale në Bashkësinë Europiane; si është kjo politikë sot dhe si pretendohet të jetë në të ardhmen. Pra, në fokus të interesimit do të jetë evoluimi i politikës sociale në Unionin Europian dhe kahjet e zhvillimit të mëtejm të kësaj politike.

Politika konsiderohet si shprehje e vlerave dhe preferencave. Analiza politike është sa aktivitet normativ aq edhe aktivitet empirik. Sidoqoftë, përderisa politika specifike apo tërësia e politikave të caktuara mund të shprehin formulime rreth asaj se çfarë duhet bërë, dhe përderisa këto kanë forcën e ligjit, në anën tjetër politika sociale nuk mund të imponoj ndryshime në disa sjellje apo qëndrime. Megjithatë, politika sociale mund të krijoj një ambient të përshtatshëm për ndryshimin e këtyre sjelljeve dhe qëndrimeve.[1]

Konkretisht, autori i njohur i dimensionit social të politikave, Boulding argumentonte se objektivë (qëllim) kryesore e çfarëdo politike sociale është “të ndërtoj komunitetin ( bashkësinë)”.[2] Pra, shqetësim kryesorë i autorëve të ndryshëm të politikave sociale është krijimi i një ambienti në të cilin qeniet njerëzore marrin përgjegjësi për mirëqenien e të tjerëve dhe ku të drejtat individuale nuk kanë prioritet kundrejt të drejtave të komunitetit (bashkësisë). Sido që të jetë, asnjë politikë sociale nuk mund t’ua imponoj njerëzve që t’i bëjnë këto gjëra dhe të integrohen në bashkësi, nëse një gjë të këtillë nuk e dëshirojnë vet njerëzit.[3]



Politika sociale në marrëveshjet për krijimin e Bashkësisë Europiane


Që nga themelimi i Bashkësisë Europiane për Thëngjill dhe Çelik ( BETHÇ ), kanë kaluar dekada të tëra.[4] Marrëveshjet e para me të cilat u themelua Bashkësia Europiane nuk e garantonin europianizimin e atyre mekanizmave që njihen si “ politika sociale “ në kuptimin e gjerë. Pra nuk ishin përfillur sa duhet elementet konstituive të politikës sociale si, të drejtat themelore sociale, sigurimi social dhe ligji i punës.[5]

Atëbotë qëllimi i lidershipit europian ishte që të realizoheshin hapat e parë për parandalimin e luftërave të reja në kontinentin europian.[6] Në njëfarë mënyre mendohej se rritja e bashkëpunimit, para së gjithash atij ekonomik, ndërmjet Francës dhe Gjermanisë do t’i garantonte Europës një paqe dhe siguri afatgjate. Duke u mbështetur në këto objektiva, asokohe nuk është menduar shumë në politikat sociale.[7] Më vonë kur lufta në Europë do të konsiderohet ide e tejkaluar, do të bëhen tentativat e para për aplikimin e politikave sociale, përkatësisht, elementeve konstituive që i pëbëjnë këto politika do t’u kushtohet rëndësi më e madhe.



Zvillimi i “dimensionit social” deri në Marrëveshjen e Maastricht-it


Dy nivelet e dispozitave të politikës sociale janë me rëndësi kur bëhet studimi i aktiviteteve relevante të UE-së.[8] E para, dispozitat kuazi-kushtetuese të marrëveshjeve me të cilat janë themeluar: Bashkësia Europiane për Thëngjill dhe Çelik (BETHÇ) dhe Bashkësia Europiane për Energji Atomike (BEEA), i atribuojnë kompetenca selektive në sferën e politikës sociale nivelit europian të qeverisjes. E dyta, legjislacioni i institucioneve të UE-së,[9] që i vendosë në një vend mjaftë specifik aktivitetet e politikave sociale.

Marrëveshjet për themelimin e BETHÇ-së dhe BEEA-së përmbanin disa dispozita për politikat sociale, edhe pse ato zënin një vend shumë të vogël në këto marrëveshje.[10] Kjo për arsye se këto komunitete kishin prioritet proceset integrative për këto produkte. Këto dy Bashkësi (BETHÇ dhe BEEA) përmbanin detyrime të përgjithësuara, që kishin të bënin me rritjen e punësimit,[11] përkatësisht uljen e papunësisë dhe përmirësimin e standardit të jetesës për banorët e vendeve anëtare të këtyre komuniteteve.

Përpos këtyre dispozitave, marrëveshjet për themelimin e komuniteteve të para europiane përmbanin edhe dispozita të shumta në lidhje me mbrojtjen e shëndetit të punëtorëve, por edhe të publikut të gjerë.[12] Kjo sepse, nxjerrja e përpunimi i thëngjillit dhe çelikut ishte shumë e mundimshme për punëtorët. Gjatë punës ata merrnin lëndime të shpeshta për shkak të nivelit të ultë të teknologjisë me të cilën asokohe nxerrej dhe përpunohej thëngjilli. Më vonë, me nënshkrimin e marrëveshjes për Bashkësinë Ekonomike Europiane (BEE), politikave sociale do t’u kushtohet rëndësi më e madhe.[13] Në këtë mënyrë, politika sociale do të bëhet pjesë konstituive e të gjitha marrëveshjeve që do të pasojnë.

Shkolla të ndryshme të mendimit të poitikave sociale morrën pjesë në negociatat për nënshkrimin e marrëveshjes me të cilën themelohej Bashkësia Ekonomike Europiane.[14] Disa shtete angazhoheshin vetëm për konceptin neo-liberal të tregut dhe tentonin të vendosin tregun e lirë edhe në sferën e punës dhe të sigurimit social. Në anën tjetër, disa vende deklaroheshin për një nivel të caktuar të harmonizimit të shpenzimeve në fushën sociale dhe atë të punës.[15]

Në fund u arrit kompromisi sipas të cilit nuk parashihej harmonizimi i politikave sociale në nivel europian.[16] Pra, vendet anëtare të Bashkësisë Ekonomike Europiane (BEE) ishin të pavarura në përpilimin dhe implementimin e politikave sociale. Sidoqoftë, nuk lejohej divergjencë e madhe në këtë drejtim. Filozofia dominante e marrëveshjes së BEE-së ishte se mirëqenia sociale duhet të arrihet përmes rritjes ekonomike;[17] ekonomia do të bazohej në parimet e tregut të lirë dhe nuk do te lejohet një politikë sociale rregullative dhe distributive (shpërndarëse).

Në marrëveshjen për themelimin e Bashkësisë Ekonomike Europiane (BEE), për herë të parë i janë dhënë disa autorizime Komisionit Europian, në lidhje me sferën e politikave sociale.[18] Kështu, Komisionit Europian i janë dhënë detyra që të promovoj kooperimin (bashkëpunimin) ndërmjet vendeve anëtare të BEE-së. Këto detyrime kishin të bënin me çështjen e punësimit; ligjin e punës dhe kushtet e punës; trajnimet profesionale bazike dhe të avansuara; sigurimin social; parandalimin e aksidenteve në punë; higjienën në vendin e punës; të drejtën e bashkimit në sindikata; dhe të drejtën e negociimit ndërmjet punëtorëve dhe punëdhënësve në lidhje me çmimin e punës.[19]

Megjithatë, karakteri i përgjegjësive të Komisionit Europian në këto punë ishte vetëm konsultativ.[20] Me fjalë të tjera, Komisioni konsultohej me vendet anëtare të BEE-së për problemet e natyrës sociale, me të cilat preokupoheshin shtetet e BEE-së. Në këtë mënyrë u konfirmua fakti se fenomenet e politikave sociale ishin përgjegjësi ekskluzive e vendeve të BEE-së. Nuk duhet harruar se në funksion të proceseve integruese,[21] ndërhyrja në fushën e politikave sociale ishte mundësuar me anë të dispozitave specifike.

Legjislacioni social dhe politika sociale në Bashkësinë Europiane


Ekziston një literaturë e gjerë dhe mjaft e pasur për zhvillimin e politikave sociale në Bashkësinë Europiane.[22] Zhvillimet më të rëndësishme në sferën e politikave sociale janë bërë në ligjin e punës dhe në atë të sigurimeve sociale. Kujdes i veçantë i është kushtuar koordinimit të sistemeve të sigurimeve nacionale. Ky koordinim nuk nënkupton harmonizimin e ploë të sistemeve nacionale.[23] Këtë më së miri e tregon fakti se edhe sot në Unionin Europian ekzistojnë dallime në pagat e punëtorëve, në bazë të të cilave përcaktohet lartësia e sigurimeve sociale.

Edhe në sektorin e ligjit të punës Bashkësia Europiane preokupohej me probleme të shumta.[24] Me plotë të drejtë mund të thuhet se institucionet e Bashkësisë Europiane nuk kishin kompetenca të bëjnë harmonizimin e dispozitave nacionale që kishin të bënin me ligjin e punës. Me kalimin e kohës problemet në këtë sferë u rritën shumë. Kjo bëri që gjatë viteve të 70-ta, të shekullit të kaluar, të miratohen një numër i madh i direktivave, qëllimi i të cilave ishte harmonizimi i mëtejm i ligjit të punës në nivel europian.[25]

Këto direktiva ndikuan që shumë rregulla, të cilat vlenin në nivelin nacional të derogohen dhe të mos vlejnë më. Në vend të tyre filluan të vlejnë rregulla të reja të karakterit supra-nacional.[26] Si rrjedhim u krijuan programe të shumta për harmonizimin e parametrave në fushën e ligjit të punës. Rëndësi e veçantë i kushtohej mbrojtjes së punëtoreve shtatëzëna; mbrojtjes së punëtorëve të rinj; punëtorëve të një shteti anëtar të BEE-së që punonin në shtetin tjetër anëtar të BEE-së.[27]

Në dy dekadat e para të funksionimit të saj, BEE-ja me politikat e saja angazhohej për realizimin e objektivave të proklamuara në marrëveshje.[28] E tëra që bëhej në lidhje me poltikat sociale ishte ajo se garantohej lëvizja e lirë e punëtorëve në të gjitha vendet anëtare të BEE-së, dhe asgjë më shumë. Në fillim të viteve të 70-ta, klima politike ndryshoi. BEE-ja, përkatësisht integrimet që ajo kishte konstituuar nuk ishin të mjaftueshme. Tentohej integrimi i mëtejm; pra, pretendohej unioni ekonomik dhe ai monetar.[29] Në këtë kontekst reforma e Fondit Social Europian konsiderohej si mundësi për bashkërenditje të politikave sociale, dhe përqendrimin e tyre në nivelin supra-nacional.



Politika sociale në Marrëveshjen e Maastricht-it


Marrëveshja e Maastricht-it gjeneroi ndryshime përmbajtësore në të gjitha sferat. Proceset integrative vazhduan edhe më tutje drejt një integrimi më të përsosur. U bë përurimi i një unioni politik dhe monetar. Termi “union politik” i referohej forcimit të një sistemi (tërësie) të institucioneve; promovohej reforma procedurale si dhe inovacioni i politikave substanciale. Politikat sociale, përkatësisht reformimi i tyre ishin çështje kapitale në këtë drejtim.[30] Duhet theksuar se Parlamentit Europian i jepeshin kompetenca të shumta në sferën e ligj-vënies.

Marrëveshja e Maastricht-it në mënyrë eksplicite ( të qartë ) përcaktonte kompetencat e Unionit Europian në sferën e politikave sociale. Këto kompetenca mund të përmbledhen në paraqitjen e mëposhtme:

· Kushtet e punës;
· Informimi dhe konsultimi me punëtorët;
· Barazia gjinore për forcën e punës;
· Integrimi i personave të përjashtuar nga forca e punës;
· Sigurimi social dhe mbrojtja e punëtorëve;
· Mbrojtja e punëtorëve pas shfuqizimit të kontratës;
· Përfaqësimi i interesave kolektive;
· Punësimi në vende të treta;
· Lëvizjet e lira të punëtorëve.[31]

Politika sociale në Gjermani

Kornizë ekonomiko-sistemore për politikën sociale në Gjermani është ekonomia sociale e tregut.[32] Për ekonominë sociale të tregut thuhet se është “rruga e tretë” ndërmjet kapitalizmit klasik dhe socializmit totalitar. Gjermania në aktin më të lartë juridik siguron realizimin e drejtësisë sociale: garantohen liritë individuale në lëmin e veprimit, kontraktimit, zgjedhjes së profesionit, lëvizjes së punëtorëve dhe pronës private.[33]

Kujdes i veçantë i kushtohet nivelit të lartë të punësimit.[34] Me këtë synohet të ruhet stabiliteti social, funksionimi më i mirë i forcës punuese etj. Janë të njohura veprimet e qeverisë gjermane në aplikimin e masave kejnsiane me qëllim të ruajtjes së shkallës së lartë të punësimit. Politika e funksionimit të fuqisë punëtore shfrytëzon dy grupe instrumentesh: “aktive” dhe “kompensuese”. Politika aktive ka të bëjë me shërbimet për arsimimin profesional, ofrimin e ndihmës me rastin e kalimit në punë të re etj. Kurse politika kompensuese ka të bëjë me kompensimin material të atyre që janë të papunë.[35]



Konkluzioni

Deduktimi nga gjithë kjo është i qartë, politika sociale e Bashkësisë Europiane ka evoluuar në drejtim pozitiv. Me themelimin e BETHÇ-së, por edhe më vonë, politika sociale ka qenë e anashkaluar gati në tërësi. Mirëpo, me kalimin e kohës, do të kuptohet rëndësia që ka politika sociale për proceset integrative që tashmë kishin përfshirë Kontinentin e Europës. Hapat e parë integrues në politikat sociale të vendeve europiane u bënë për të mbrojtur fuqinë punëtore dhe shëndetin e saj por edhe të publikut të gjerë; në këtë kohë rëndësi i kushtohej edhe sistemit të sigurimeve sociale.

Me marrëveshjen e Maastricht-it gjërat filluan të ndryshojnë për të mirë. Që nga ajo kohë, kur filloi të realizohet unioni politik e më vonë edhe unioni monetar, shumica e kompetencave të fushës së politikave sociale ka filluar të bartet në institucionet europiane. Tempoja e integrimeve është intensifikuar shumë; mundësitë reale janë që kompetencat e institucioneve europiane në sferën e politikave sociale të rriten edhe më shumë. Pra, pritet të ndodh unifikimi i politikave sociale në kuadër të Unionit Europian.

Notes:

[1] Clive Archer & Fiona Butler. The European Community: Structure and Process. New York. St. Martin’s Press. 1992. Fq. 18.
[2] Desmond Dinan. Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European Community. Boulder. Linne Rienner. 1994. Fq. 23.
[3] David Harrison. The Organisation of Europe. London. Routledge. 1995. Fq. 25.
[4] Ibid. Fq. 29.
[5] David Harrison. The Organisation of Europe. London. Routledge. 1995. Fq. 32.
[6] Skender Berisha & Musa Limani. Integrimet Ekonomike europiane. Prishtinë. Koha. 2004. Fq. 24.
[7] Blerim Reka. E Drejta e Unionit Europian. Prishtinë. KIEAI. 2000. Fq.121.
[8] David Harrison. The Organisation of Europe. London. Routledge. 1995. Fq. 46.
[9] Ibid. Fq.49.
[10] Stephan Leibfried. European Union Countries: Social Policy. London. Pierson. 2000. Fq. 125.
[11] Desmond Dinan. Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European Community. Boulder. Linne Rienner. 1994. Fq. 321.
[12] Stephan Leibfried. European Union Countries: Social Policy. London. Pierson. 2000. Fq. 130.
[13] David Harrison. The Organisation of Europe. London. Routledge. 1995. Fq. 56.
[14] Ibid. Fq. 61.
[15] Stephan Leibfried. European Union Countries: Social Policy. London. Pierson. 2000. Fq. 135.
[16] Ibid. Fq.139.
[17] Bashkim Zahiti. E Drejta Europiane. Prishtinë. De Rada. 2002. Fq. 76.
[18] Stephan Leibfried. European Union Countries: Social Policy. London. Pierson. 2000. Fq. 139.
[19] Desmond Dinan. Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European Community. Boulder. Linne Rienner. 1994. Fq. 328.
[20] David Harrison. The Organisation of Europe. London. Routledge. 1995. Fq. 59.
[21] Stephan Leibfried. European Union Countries: Social Policy. London. Pierson. 2000. Fq. 143.
[22] Ibid. Fq. 147.
[23] David Harrison. The Organisation of Europe. London. Routledge. 1995. Fq. 67.
[24] Ibid. Fq. 151.
[25] Fiona Butler. The European Community. New York. St. Martin’s Press. 1992. Fq.142.
[26] Desmond Dinan. Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European Community. Boulder. Linne Rienner. 1994. Fq. 328.
[27] Stephan Leibfried. European Union Countries: Social Policy. London. Pierson. 2000. Fq. 149.
[28] Fiona Butler. The European Community. New York. St. Martin’s Press. 1992. Fq.146.
[29] David Harrison. The Organisation of Europe. London. Routledge. 1995. Fq. 69.
[30] Stephan Leibfried. European Union Countries: Social Policy. London. Pierson. 2000. Fq. 153.
[31] David Harrison. The Organisation of Europe. London. Routledge. 1995. Fq. 69.
[32] Nagip Skenderi. Ekonomia dhe Politika Botërore. Prishtinë. UP. 2003. Fq. 197.
[33] Ibid. Fq. 198.
[34] Stephan Leibfried. European Union Countries: Social Policy. London. Pierson. 2000. Fq. 157.
[35] Nagip Skenderi. Ekonomia dhe Politika Botërore. Prishtinë. UP. 2003. Fq. 203.

Bibliografia

Nagip Skenderi. Ekonomia dhe Politika Botërore. Prishtinë. UP. 2003.
Blerim Reka. E Drejta e Unionit Europian. Prishtinë. KIEAI. 2000.
Skender Berisha & Musa Limani. Integrimet Ekonomike Europiane. Prishtinë. Koha. 2004
Bashkim Zahiti. E Drejta Europiane. Prishtinë. De Rada. 2002.


Burime nga Libraria On-line: Questia Media America, Inc. http://www.questia.com/

Clive Archer & Fiona Butler. The European Community: Structure and Process. New York. St. Martin’s Press. 1992.
Desmond Dinan. Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European Community. Boulder. Linne Rienner. 1994.
David Harrison. The Organisation of Europe. London. Routledge. 1995.
Stephan Leibfried. European Union Countries: Social Policy. London. Pierson. 2000.
Fiona Butler. The European Community. New York. St. Martin’s Press. 1992.